FILOSOFISKA NOTISER


Filosofiska Notiser Årgång 7, Nr 1, 2020


Risto Hilpinen
Alf Ross and Jørgen Jørgensen on Reasoning about Directives and Norms

Abstract
This paper is a study of the foundations of deontic logic in the light of Alf Ross's paradox of disjunctive directives and Jørgen Jørgensen's problem about logical relations among imperatives ("Jørgensen's dilemma"). It analyzes performative and assertoric utterances of deontic sentences and the distinction between norms (directives) and normative (deontic) propositions. The relation of logical consequence among normative propositions can be defined in the usual way in terms of the concept of truth, and it is argued that the logic of normative propositions (as defined here) can serve as the logic of norms.

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Per-Erik Malmnäs
Kollektiva Val och Arrows Teorem

Abstrakt
I denna essä ges förhoppningsvis nya argument för att en del av de villkor som ekonomen Kenneth Arrow ansett som nödvändiga för rationella kollektiva beslut i själva verket är orimliga och att det inte föreligger några hinder för att på ett rationellt sätt generera kollektiva preferenser och träffa kollektiva val. Vi behöver bara låta slumpexperiment få spela en viss roll.

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Tero Tulenheimo
The Truth of Future Contingents: An Analysis of Truth-Maker Indeterminacy

Abstract
I argue that the semantics of sentences expressing future contingent propositions is best viewed as being based on a clear distinction between a time at which a proposition is true and a time at which a state of affairs that makes it true gets actualized. That a prediction is true here and now means that its truth-maker gets actualized later. This is not to say that if a contingent proposition p concerning the future is true at t, it acquires the truth-value true at t only retrospectively, at a later moment. Nor must this be seen as suggesting that it is a settled, unpreventable fact at t that p is true at t. It just means that the reason for its present truth is something that happens later on: the future happens to evolve in such a way as to make a truth-maker of p obtain. In this case, then, it can be said that at t, p is truth-maker indeterminate, or that it has an indeterminate truth-maker. I develop a formal semantics based on this analysis in the follow-up article 'A Formal Framework for Future Contingents'. Here, I lay down the conceptual framework and indicate Boethius and Abelard as precursors of the view I wish to defend.

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Tero Tulenheimo
A Formal Framework for Future Contingents

Abstract
In this article, I present a formal semantic framework that renders explicit how to reconcile the condition that a proposition about a contingent future event is true at a moment t0 with the idea that at t0, this proposition is 'truth-maker indeterminate': a state of affairs making it true will obtain later on, though no such state of affairs obtains at t0. The semantics I formulate employs 'open temporal models'. They represent the passage of time by a specific component termed time-resource, which acts on durations construed as model-external inputs. A model does not by itself specify which course of events gets actualized in a given duration depending on the latest moment that has already got actualized. A time-resource merely represents schematically the dependence between a moment t and a course of events that gets actualized in a time-span of a given length counted from t; until that much time has indeed passed, it is not fixed which course of events actually extends t. Further, I introduce evaluations as a fine-grained tool for studying truth-conditions of tensed formulas, and I use this tool to define the notion of truth-maker. I define what it means that a truth-maker will obtain but does not, and what it means for a truth-maker to be determinate. It is proven that my semantic analysis retains the desirable link between determinacy and historical necessity-namely, a truth-maker of a proposition being determinate entails that the proposition is historically necessary.

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Filosofiska Notiser Årgång 6, Nr 1, 2019

This is a special issue on deontic logic. More papers will appear later.


Franz von Kutschera
Joint Obligations

Abstract
Obligations are addressed to persons and require that they do something, refrain from doing something, prevent something or see to it, that a certain state of affairs is realized or preserved. Therefore a theory of action is the appropriate frame for deontic logic. The frame for such a theory is the logic of branching histories (T x W logic), a combination of tense and modality, to which alternatives for persons are added. In a paper on collective alternatives (2014) I have shown that the alternatives for groups of agents do not always derive from the alternatives of their members. In this paper I want to examine the consequences for deontic logic. Its largest part, however, is about the action-theoretic preliminaries. Readers familiar with them may turn directly to the last paragraph.

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Lou Goble
Axioms for Hansson's Dyadic Deontic Logics

Abstract
This paper presents axiomatic systems equivalent to Bengt Hansson's semantically defined dyadic deontic logics, DSDL1, DSDL2 and DSDL3. Each axiomatic system is demonstrated to be sound and complete with respect to the particular classes of models Hansson defined, and in that way to be equivalent to his logics. I also include another similar member of the family I call DSDL2.5 and provide an axiomatic system for it. These systems are further found to be decidable, and, although DSDL3 is compact, the three weaker ones are shown not to be.

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John-Jules Meyer
Deontic Dynamic Logic: a Retrospective

Abstract
In this paper a retrospective is given on the development of deontic dynamic logic. It first reviews the basic system PDeL as introduced in 1988, with emphasis on conceptual issues and technical choices and properties. It then continues with later developments and applications by ourselves and related work by others. Thus we will see how contrary-to-duties and free choice permissions are treated, and how violations can be handled more expressively, including a way of dealing with red/green states and transitions.

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Jan Odelstad
Joining conceptual systems - three remarks on TJS

Abstract
The Theory of Joining Systems, abbreviated TJS, is a general theory of representing for example legal and other normative systems as formal structures. It uses algebraic tools and a fundamental idea in this algebraic approach is the representation of a conditional norm as an ordered pair of concepts. Another fundamental idea is that the components in such a pair are concepts of different sorts. Conditional norms are thus links from for example descriptive to normative concepts and the result is the joining of two conceptual systems. However, there are often at least three kinds of concepts involved in many normative systems, viz. descriptive, normative and intermediate concepts. Intermediate concepts such as ‘being the owner’ and ‘being a citizen’ have descriptive grounds and normative consequences and can be said to be located intermediately between the system of grounds and the system of consequences. Intermediate concepts function as bridges (links, joinings) between concepts of different sorts. The aim of this paper is to further develop TJS and widen the range of application of the theory. It will be shown that the idea of norms as ordered pairs is flexible enough to handle nested implications and hypothetical consequences. Minimal joinings, which are important in TJS, are shown to be closely related to formal concepts in Formal Concept Analysis. TJS was developed for concepts of a special kind, namely conditions. In this paper a new model of TJS is developed, where the concepts are attributes and aspects, and the role of intermediate concepts in this model is discussed.

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Federico L. G. Faroldi
Deontic Modality, Generically

Abstract
This position paper aims to explore some preliminary suggestions to develop a theory of deontic modalities under a generic understanding. I suggest, for instance, that a sentence such as ‘Everyone ought to pay taxes’ is true just in case the generic (deontically relevant) individual pays taxes. Different degrees of genericity are explored, without assuming too much about a specific theory of genericity. I argue that such an analysis captures our intuitions about exceptions and the general character of deontic claims better than classical approaches based on possibleworld semantics and than defeasibility-based approaches, while remaining within a broadly deductive framework.

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Paul McNamara
Toward a Systematization of Logics for Monadic and Dyadic Agency & Ability, Revisited

Abstract
I specify a very large class of logics with monadic and dyadic modal operators, primarily (but not exclusively) intended to represent monadic and dyadic agency in the tradition of Kanger, Pörn, Elgesem, etc. I explore logics both for pure monadic agency, pure dyadic agency, and mixed monadic-dyadic agency. Employing neighborhood semantic frames, but with an extra parameter governed by a modest algebraic structure, I prove determination theorems for all the consistent logics of those specified. I briefly present some motivation and rationales for some of the principles, but the main focus is on the framework and key meta-theorems.

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