Årgång 7, Nr 1, 2020
Alf Ross and Jørgen Jørgensen on Reasoning about Directives and
This paper is a study of the foundations of deontic logic in the
light of Alf Ross's paradox of disjunctive directives and Jørgen
Jørgensen's problem about logical relations among imperatives ("Jørgensen's
dilemma"). It analyzes performative and assertoric utterances of
deontic sentences and the distinction between norms (directives)
and normative (deontic) propositions. The relation of logical consequence
among normative propositions can be defined in the usual way in
terms of the concept of truth, and it is argued that the logic of
normative propositions (as defined here) can serve as the logic
Kollektiva Val och Arrows Teorem
I denna essä ges förhoppningsvis nya argument för att en del av
de villkor som ekonomen Kenneth Arrow ansett som nödvändiga för
rationella kollektiva beslut i själva verket är orimliga och att
det inte föreligger några hinder för att på ett rationellt sätt
generera kollektiva preferenser och träffa kollektiva val. Vi behöver
bara låta slumpexperiment få spela en viss roll.
The Truth of Future Contingents: An Analysis of Truth-Maker Indeterminacy
I argue that the semantics of sentences expressing future contingent
propositions is best viewed as being based on a clear distinction
between a time at which a proposition is true and a time at which
a state of affairs that makes it true gets actualized. That a prediction
is true here and now means that its truth-maker gets actualized
later. This is not to say that if a contingent proposition p
concerning the future is true at t, it acquires the truth-value
true at t only retrospectively, at a later moment.
Nor must this be seen as suggesting that it is a settled, unpreventable
fact at t that p is true at t. It just means
that the reason for its present truth is something that happens
later on: the future happens to evolve in such a way as to make
a truth-maker of p obtain. In this case, then, it can be
said that at t, p is truth-maker indeterminate, or
that it has an indeterminate truth-maker. I develop a formal semantics
based on this analysis in the follow-up article 'A Formal Framework
for Future Contingents'. Here, I lay down the conceptual framework
and indicate Boethius and Abelard as precursors of the view I wish
A Formal Framework for Future Contingents
In this article, I present a formal semantic framework that renders
explicit how to reconcile the condition that a proposition about
a contingent future event is true at a moment t0 with the
idea that at t0, this proposition is 'truth-maker indeterminate':
a state of affairs making it true will obtain later on, though no
such state of affairs obtains at t0. The semantics I formulate
employs 'open temporal models'. They represent the passage of time
by a specific component termed time-resource, which acts
on durations construed as model-external inputs. A model
does not by itself specify which course of events gets actualized
in a given duration depending on the latest moment that has already
got actualized. A time-resource merely represents schematically
the dependence between a moment t and a course of events
that gets actualized in a time-span of a given length counted from
t; until that much time has indeed passed, it is not fixed
which course of events actually extends t. Further, I introduce
evaluations as a fine-grained tool for studying truth-conditions
of tensed formulas, and I use this tool to define the notion of
truth-maker. I define what it means that a truth-maker will obtain
but does not, and what it means for a truth-maker to be determinate.
It is proven that my semantic analysis retains the desirable link
between determinacy and historical necessity-namely, a truth-maker
of a proposition being determinate entails that the proposition
is historically necessary.
Årgång 6, Nr 1, 2019
This is a special issue
on deontic logic. More papers will appear later.
Franz von Kutschera
Obligations are addressed to persons and require that they do something,
refrain from doing something, prevent something or see to it, that
a certain state of affairs is realized or preserved. Therefore a
theory of action is the appropriate frame for deontic logic. The
frame for such a theory is the logic of branching histories (T x
W logic), a combination of tense and modality, to which alternatives
for persons are added. In a paper on collective alternatives (2014)
I have shown that the alternatives for groups of agents do not always
derive from the alternatives of their members. In this paper I want
to examine the consequences for deontic logic. Its largest part,
however, is about the action-theoretic preliminaries. Readers familiar
with them may turn directly to the last paragraph.
Axioms for Hansson's Dyadic Deontic Logics
This paper presents axiomatic systems equivalent to Bengt Hansson's
semantically defined dyadic deontic logics, DSDL1, DSDL2 and DSDL3.
Each axiomatic system is demonstrated to be sound and complete
with respect to the particular classes of models Hansson defined,
and in that way to be equivalent to his logics. I also include
another similar member of the family I call DSDL2.5 and provide
an axiomatic system for it. These systems are further found to
be decidable, and, although DSDL3 is compact, the three weaker
ones are shown not to be.
Deontic Dynamic Logic: a Retrospective
In this paper a retrospective is given on the development of deontic
dynamic logic. It first reviews the basic system PDeL as introduced
in 1988, with emphasis on conceptual issues and technical choices
and properties. It then continues with later developments and
applications by ourselves and related work by others. Thus we
will see how contrary-to-duties and free choice permissions are
treated, and how violations can be handled more expressively,
including a way of dealing with red/green states and transitions.
Joining conceptual systems - three remarks on TJS
The Theory of Joining Systems, abbreviated TJS, is a general theory
of representing for example legal and other normative systems
as formal structures. It uses algebraic tools and a fundamental
idea in this algebraic approach is the representation of a conditional
norm as an ordered pair of concepts. Another fundamental idea
is that the components in such a pair are concepts of different
sorts. Conditional norms are thus links from for example descriptive
to normative concepts and the result is the joining of two conceptual
systems. However, there are often at least three kinds of concepts
involved in many normative systems, viz. descriptive, normative
and intermediate concepts. Intermediate concepts such as ‘being
the owner’ and ‘being a citizen’ have descriptive grounds and
normative consequences and can be said to be located intermediately
between the system of grounds and the system of consequences.
Intermediate concepts function as bridges (links, joinings) between
concepts of different sorts. The aim of this paper is to further
develop TJS and widen the range of application of the theory.
It will be shown that the idea of norms as ordered pairs is flexible
enough to handle nested implications and hypothetical consequences.
Minimal joinings, which are important in TJS, are shown to be
closely related to formal concepts in Formal Concept Analysis.
TJS was developed for concepts of a special kind, namely conditions.
In this paper a new model of TJS is developed, where the concepts
are attributes and aspects, and the role of intermediate concepts
in this model is discussed.
Federico L. G. Faroldi
Deontic Modality, Generically
This position paper aims to explore some preliminary suggestions
to develop a theory of deontic modalities under a generic understanding.
I suggest, for instance, that a sentence such as ‘Everyone ought
to pay taxes’ is true just in case the generic (deontically relevant)
individual pays taxes. Different degrees of genericity are explored,
without assuming too much about a specific theory of genericity.
I argue that such an analysis captures our intuitions about exceptions
and the general character of deontic claims better than classical
approaches based on possibleworld semantics and than defeasibility-based
approaches, while remaining within a broadly deductive framework.
Toward a Systematization of Logics for Monadic and Dyadic Agency
& Ability, Revisited
I specify a very large class of logics with monadic and dyadic
modal operators, primarily (but not exclusively) intended to represent
monadic and dyadic agency in the tradition of Kanger, Pörn, Elgesem,
etc. I explore logics both for pure monadic agency, pure dyadic
agency, and mixed monadic-dyadic agency. Employing neighborhood
semantic frames, but with an extra parameter governed by a modest
algebraic structure, I prove determination theorems for all the
consistent logics of those specified. I briefly present some motivation
and rationales for some of the principles, but the main focus
is on the framework and key meta-theorems.