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Filosofiska
Notiser Årgång 7, Nr 1, 2020
Risto Hilpinen
Alf Ross and Jørgen Jørgensen on Reasoning about Directives and
Norms
Abstract
This paper is a study of the foundations of deontic logic in the
light of Alf Ross's paradox of disjunctive directives and Jørgen
Jørgensen's problem about logical relations among imperatives ("Jørgensen's
dilemma"). It analyzes performative and assertoric utterances of
deontic sentences and the distinction between norms (directives)
and normative (deontic) propositions. The relation of logical consequence
among normative propositions can be defined in the usual way in
terms of the concept of truth, and it is argued that the logic of
normative propositions (as defined here) can serve as the logic
of norms.
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Per-Erik Malmnäs
Kollektiva Val och Arrows Teorem
Abstrakt
I denna essä ges förhoppningsvis nya argument för att en del av
de villkor som ekonomen Kenneth Arrow ansett som nödvändiga för
rationella kollektiva beslut i själva verket är orimliga och att
det inte föreligger några hinder för att på ett rationellt sätt
generera kollektiva preferenser och träffa kollektiva val. Vi behöver
bara låta slumpexperiment få spela en viss roll.
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Tero Tulenheimo
The Truth of Future Contingents: An Analysis of Truth-Maker Indeterminacy
Abstract
I argue that the semantics of sentences expressing future contingent
propositions is best viewed as being based on a clear distinction
between a time at which a proposition is true and a time at which
a state of affairs that makes it true gets actualized. That a prediction
is true here and now means that its truth-maker gets actualized
later. This is not to say that if a contingent proposition p
concerning the future is true at t, it acquires the truth-value
true at t only retrospectively, at a later moment.
Nor must this be seen as suggesting that it is a settled, unpreventable
fact at t that p is true at t. It just means
that the reason for its present truth is something that happens
later on: the future happens to evolve in such a way as to make
a truth-maker of p obtain. In this case, then, it can be
said that at t, p is truth-maker indeterminate, or
that it has an indeterminate truth-maker. I develop a formal semantics
based on this analysis in the follow-up article 'A Formal Framework
for Future Contingents'. Here, I lay down the conceptual framework
and indicate Boethius and Abelard as precursors of the view I wish
to defend.
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Tero Tulenheimo
A Formal Framework for Future Contingents
Abstract
In this article, I present a formal semantic framework that renders
explicit how to reconcile the condition that a proposition about
a contingent future event is true at a moment t0 with the
idea that at t0, this proposition is 'truth-maker indeterminate':
a state of affairs making it true will obtain later on, though no
such state of affairs obtains at t0. The semantics I formulate
employs 'open temporal models'. They represent the passage of time
by a specific component termed time-resource, which acts
on durations construed as model-external inputs. A model
does not by itself specify which course of events gets actualized
in a given duration depending on the latest moment that has already
got actualized. A time-resource merely represents schematically
the dependence between a moment t and a course of events
that gets actualized in a time-span of a given length counted from
t; until that much time has indeed passed, it is not fixed
which course of events actually extends t. Further, I introduce
evaluations as a fine-grained tool for studying truth-conditions
of tensed formulas, and I use this tool to define the notion of
truth-maker. I define what it means that a truth-maker will obtain
but does not, and what it means for a truth-maker to be determinate.
It is proven that my semantic analysis retains the desirable link
between determinacy and historical necessity-namely, a truth-maker
of a proposition being determinate entails that the proposition
is historically necessary.
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