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Abstract
Saul Smilansky's theory of free will and moral responsibility consists of two parts; dualism and illusionism. Dualism is the thesis that both compatibilism and hard determinism are partly true, and has puzzled many philosophers. I argue that Smilansky's dualism can be given an unquestionably coherent and comprehensible interpretation if we reformulate it in terms of pro tanto reasons. Dualism so understood is the thesis that respect for persons gives us pro tanto reasons to blame wrongdoers, and also pro tanto reasons not to blame them. These reasons must be weighed against each other (and against relevant consequentialist reasons) in order to find out what we all things considered ought to do.

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Abstract
In "Should Race Matter?," David Boonin proposes the compensation principle: When an agent wrongfully harms another person, she incurs a moral obligation to compensate that person for the harms she has caused. Boonin then argues that the United States government has wrongfully harmed black Americans by adopting pro-slavery laws and other discriminatory laws and practices following the end of slavery, and therefore the United States government has an obligation to pay reparations for slavery and discriminatory laws and practices to those who have been harmed by them - in particular, to contemporary black Americans. Here I argue that the compensation principle is false because it violates the control principle, the foundational principle of ethics that states that moral responsibility requires control; for an agent to be morally responsible for something, whether or not she does that thing must be within her control. If the compensation principle creates a moral obligation for an agent to compensate a harmed party, failure to do so will result in that agent's being morally blameworthy for failing in her obligation. Because some harms cannot be compensated for, agents who wrongfully harm others will be required to do something that is outside of their control.

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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to prove some theorems in alethic-deontic logic. Alethic-deontic logic is a kind of bimodal logic that combines ordinary alethic (modal) logic and deontic logic. Ordinary alethic logic is a branch of logic that deals with modal concepts, such as necessity and possibility, modal sentences, arguments and systems. Deontic logic is the logic of norms. It is about normative words, such as "ought", "right" and "wrong", normative sentences, arguments and systems. Alethic-deontic logic contains both modal and normative concepts and can be used to study how these interact. This paper contains some interesting theorems that can be proved in alethic-deontic logic. I will show that all primitive deontic operators are redundant when prefixed to the alethic operators in some systems. I will prove that necessarily equivalent sentences have the same deontic status in many systems. I will establish that the set of sentences in some alethic-deontic systems can be partitioned into five, mutually exclusive, exhaustive subsets. Finally, I will show that there are exactly ten distinct modalities in some alethic-deontic systems.

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